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INTRODUCTION 
 simplistic though not inaccurate historical view of the 
economic theories of the Twentieth Century discloses a 
pendulum-like movement between free-market and regulatory 
extremes.1  As the century began, the Industrial Revolution had 
fostered confidence that open markets and global trade would 
bring prosperity to all nations.  The consequent laissez faire 
approach to economics spread quickly.  Less than two decades 
later, enthusiasm abated as the United States sunk into the 
Great Depression and bread-lines and poverty grew in Europe.  
Heavy state regulation such as the New Deal and more overtly 
socialist programs abroad were enlisted to bring this excess 
back in check.  Wider and deeper regulation mounted for most 
of the middle decades of the century.  Inevitably, this trend also 
lost its momentum as hyper-inflation and stagflation crippled 
the American economy and Communist regimes worldwide be-
gan to collapse.  Encouraged by what is now known as the In-
formation Revolution and globalization, the pendulum swung 
back yet again, into the free market euphoria of the “booming” 
1990s.  
Today, as that “boom” seems more like a bubble and its legacy 
is marked with scandal and fraud, there are calls for greater 
corporate governance and economic regulation.  As we look 
abroad for the root causes of terrorism, hatred and ignorance, 
we find entire populations unemployed, uneducated and disen-
franchised, changed mostly for the worse by the unregulated 
forces of globalization.  History suggests we may be beginning a 
swing back towards centralized regulation and economic gov-
ernance.  Yet, we now find ourselves in a truly global economy, 
where the size and power of regulated entities often allows 
them to influence, choose among, and even control would-be 
regulators.  Consequently, we are forced to ask today: who can 
regulate a global economy, and how? 
  
 1. For the following historical narrative, I rely on DANIEL YERGIN & JOS- 
EPH STANISLAW, COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(1998) and the related Public Broadcast Systems television broadcast, tran-
scripts, interviews, and resources, which are available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/com andingheights/lo.htm. 
A 
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The difficulty of regulating a global economy has been no-
where more evident than in the attempt to enforce international 
labor rights.  The International Labor Organization (“ILO”), a 
specialized agency of the United Nations (“UN”) created for the 
purpose, has proven largely ineffective in enforcing compliance 
with even the core universal standards it has delineated.  Re-
cently there have been mounting calls to find other means to 
enforce compliance.  Perhaps loudest have been those that wish 
to see economic sanctions and/or benefits “linked” to compli-
ance.2  In such a regime, compliance with the ILO standards 
would be rewarded with benefits offered through the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (“IMF”), World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) or bilateral agreements, and violations punished with 
sanctions through the same.3   
Proposals for such linkage systems are various, and are ac-
companied by arguments just as varied in opposition.4  It is the 
purpose of this Note to offer a labor rights-based argument for 
the necessity of cooperation among international regulatory in-
stitutions, be it through such linkage systems or other means.  
While there has been much scholarship addressing the issue 
from the trade perspective,5 little has been offered from the la-
bor perspective.  I will argue that because any right is only 
  
 2. See, e.g., C. O’Neal Taylor, Linkage and Rule-Making: Observations on 
Trade and Investment and Trade and Labor, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 639 
(1998) (discussing the origins of, arguments for and difficulties with trade-
labor linkages).  While other solutions have been theorized, perhaps steeper 
obstacles face these efforts.  See, e.g., Andrew Banks & John Russo, The De-
velopment of International Campaign-Based Network Structures: A Case 
Study of the IBT and ITF World Council of UPS Unions, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 543 (1999) (suggesting that increased cooperation among unions 
across international borders will spread labor organization and create pres-
sure on employers to bring their conditions into compliance with international 
standards).  See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Econ-
omy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
987 (1995). 
 3. See, e.g., Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2002).  I will refer later to several papers delivered at this recent symposium 
which dealt with the question of linkage.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 4. For a “taxonomy” of linkage regimes and means and discussion of some 
criticisms, see David W. Leebron, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO: 
Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 11 (2002).  
 5. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 3. 
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meaningful as balanced against other rights and interests, the 
legal, social and economic framework necessary for protecting 
labor rights is as properly a subject for economic and human 
rights institutions as it is for labor institutions.  This frame-
work by definition exceeds the boundaries and capacities of the 
ILO, and so the assistance of other institutions must be 
enlisted.  Further, proposals to link economic benefits, human 
rights and labor protections on the regulatory plane may not 
seem so radical when it is observed that they are already inex-
tricably intertwined in the lives of those they effect. 
Part I will discuss briefly what labor rights are, both in con-
cept and content.  Giving an overview of the history of labor 
rights and labor rights institutions in the United States and at 
international law, I will demonstrate that labor rights occupy a 
unique position at the nexus of economic interest and human 
rights.  Due to this position, a government’s obligations to pro-
tect labor rights will necessarily involve providing more than 
just labor-specific regulations. 
In Part II, I will first show how the United States has at-
tempted to strike balances between labor rights and other 
rights, particularly those that have been used to obstruct the 
exercise of labor rights.  While international law has, at least in 
principle, struck this balance in a manner more favorable to 
workers than it is in the United States, its lack of effective com-
pliance mechanisms renders this ambitious stance ineffective 
(and perhaps even insulting to those workers who look to it for 
protection).  The difference between the “positive” and “nega-
tive” obligations the ILO imposes on governments shows the 
root of this difficulty.  For the ILO to effectively enforce these 
standards, it will have to deal with a variety of domestic labor 
and legal situations without the balancing test found in the 
American system.  I will use the extreme example of Export 
Process Zones (“EPZs”) to demonstrate these difficulties.  
In Part III, I will give an overview of the history and purpose 
of EPZs.  I will argue that, though the labor conditions in EPZs 
strikingly resemble those conditions present when the United 
States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) carved back the prop-
erty rights of employers to protect labor rights, many foreign 
legal systems offer no means by which this balance can be 
struck.  However, when EPZs are reintegrated into domestic 
social and legal frameworks, and employers and employees are 
put in the same position vis-à-vis the government, labor and 
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human rights conditions tend to improve.  I will argue that this 
trend is promising because it demonstrates that by approaching 
labor, human and economic rights and interests as inextricably 
related, conditions which foster prosperity and the protection of 
these rights thrive more easily.  
In Part IV, I will incorporate the observations of the first 
three Parts into the debate on linkage systems.  I will argue 
that the international regulatory community must recognize 
that the “positive” obligations the ILO impose upon govern-
ments by necessity encompass issues not purely labor-oriented.  
Violations of these obligations should be treated as violations of 
international human rights and/or international trade regula-
tions, but should not be, as they currently are, treated as nei-
ther.  Without cooperation with other international institutions, 
that is, without some form of linkage, the problems facing the 
ILO will not easily be overcome.  
In conclusion, I will argue that respect for labor rights, which 
do uncomfortably straddle the generic categories of economic 
and human rights, involves respect for human rights, but also 
bears directly upon economic privilege.  To see the three as in-
extricable may be the only way to secure them all, and it is in-
cumbent upon the international community to recognize this. 
I. LABOR RIGHTS – DEFINITIONS AND ORIGINS 
A. Labor Rights Defined 
The very assertion of such a thing as a labor right creates a 
difficulty in categorization: it is unclear whether labor rights 
are more properly considered economic or human rights.  At 
first glance, labor does appear to be an intrinsically economic 
activity.  Labor costs and conditions are intimately linked both 
with an employer’s revenues and an employee’s individual, fa-
milial and communal welfare.6  In this context, labor is a legiti-
mate economic issue and consequently a reasonable subject of 
trade laws, regulations and treaties.7  Further, put alongside 
  
 6. Thomas I. Palley, The Economic Case for Labor Standards: A Layman’s 
Guide, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL. L. & BUS. 183 (2001). 
 7. Robert C. Shelburne, The Trade-Labor Linkage: Issues and Prospects at 
Office of International Economic Affairs, Bureau of International Labor Af-
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the freedom from torture, slavery and summary execution, one 
would not easily recognize labor as a fundamental human right, 
if a human right at all.  These other freedoms seem much more 
basic and fundamental than the right to organize or collectively 
bargain for employment contracts.  As has been observed in a 
slightly different context, “[w]ithout adequate conditions for the 
use of freedom, what is the value of freedom?  First things come 
first: there are situations…in which boots are superior to the 
works of Shakespeare.”8  Put otherwise, labor rights will mean 
little to peoples whose lives and well-being are daily put in jeop-
ardy.   
Still, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does declare 
that “[e]veryone has the right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests.”9  We need not follow it to its 
conclusion to agree with the insight of Marxist economic theory 
that labor is not just another commodity.10  In fact, the United 
States Congress agreed in 1914 and explicitly exempted labor 
from anti-trust laws because “[t]he labor of a human being is 
not a commodity or article of commerce.”11  Instead, labor is the 
means by which individuals define themselves, provide for 
themselves and their families, and contribute to and create 
their communities.  Consequently, it should be a consideration 
before, not among, purely economic factors.  Thus, labor, consti-
tutive of human identity, dignity and self-reliance,12 seems prop-
erly protected as a human right.   
However, considering labor a human right completely sepa-
rated from economic considerations is not without its disadvan-
tages.  Perhaps the greatest challenge to international human 
  
fairs, U.S. Department of Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/oiea/ 
LS_AS SA2.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). 
 8. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, reprinted in FOUR ESSAYS ON 
LIBERTY 124 (Oxford University Press 1988) (1958). 
 9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly, 10 December 1948. G.A. Res 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. I, 
Resolutions, at 71 U.N. Doc. A/810 (198). 
 10. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 53 
(VERSO 1998) (1848).  See also KARL MARX, WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL 
(IMPORTED PUBLICATIONS, INC. 1976) (1891). 
 11. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2001). 
 12. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost 
Treasure, in ON REVOLUTION (1963).  See also, Richard Rorty, Back to Class 
Politics, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE (1999). 
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rights today is the lack of effective enforcement and compliance 
mechanisms.13  Various mechanisms for enforcing labor rights 
on their own have been proposed, but none have thus far proven 
effective.14  The most prominent proposal has been to “tie” or 
“link” respect for labor rights (and human rights in general) to 
economic carrots and sticks.15  Supporters argue that labor and 
human rights violators will be more likely to remedy their vio-
lations and comply in the future if their economic well-being is 
at stake.16  The voices in support of such regimes continue to 
multiply in force and number, but not without equal opposi-
tion.17 
Therefore, considering labor rights as only a matter of eco-
nomic interest or as strictly a human rights issue both seem 
untrue to what is actually at stake when individuals assert 
them.  It is both economic and human well-being that is secured 
or put in jeopardy when workers’ labor rights are enforced or 
violated.  It is perhaps more accurate, then, to consider labor 
rights as occupying an area of convergence between economic 
interest and human rights, a unique category unto themselves.18  
Rather than a difficulty, this uncomfortable status may in fact 
point up a valuable lesson: economic and human rights policies 
are inextricably connected, and to ignore this is to perpetuate a 
fallacy that continues to have devastating effects on the devel-
  
 13. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing 
Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183 (2002). 
 14. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 2. 
 15. See Taylor, supra note 2; Elissa Alben, GATT and the Fair Wage: A 
Historical Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 
(2001);  Jagdish Bhagwati, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, After-
word: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126 (2002).   
 16. Taylor, supra note 2. 
 17. Luc Demaret, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, The 
Social Clause is Still an Objective, Trade Union World, May 23, 2000, avail-
able at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991213959&Langua 
ge=EN (advocating for the inclusion of a “social clause” in all WTO procedures 
and agreements that would require adherence to labor rights). 
 18. The interdependence of economic interest and human rights has not 
gone unnoticed. See DECLARATION CONCERNING THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, OCT. 9, 1946, art. III, 62 Stat. 3554, 15 
U.N.T.S. 104 (“[A]ll human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the 
right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development 
in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportu-
nity.”). 
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oping world.19  Only by seeing labor as the engine of both social 
and economic prosperity does one properly understand the re-
sponsibilities one bears in shaping labor policies. 
B. Labor Rights as Legal Protections 
Several lists have been proposed to clearly enumerate the 
specific rights and liberties that occupy this area of conver-
gence.20  To whom these rights extend, against whose interven-
tion they guarantee protection, and the types of activities they 
cover are all subjects of debate in domestic and international 
law.  However, it would be fair to name the following as a fairly 
uncontroversial list of rights, even if disputes remain as to their 
scope and application: 
1. The Freedom of Association 
2. The Right to Organize  
3. The Right to Collective Bargaining  
4. The Right to Equal Opportunity and Treatment 
Each of these rights is explicitly recognized by the ILO Char-
ter and Mandate.21  In the United States, some of these rights 
are granted explicitly in the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”),22 while others are derived from basic rights granted 
elsewhere.23   
  
 19. For a discussion of various justifications of labor rights and labor un-
ions, see Peter Levine, The Legitimacy of Labor Unions, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 529 (Spring 2001). 
 20. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1998). 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of 
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by 
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3). 
Id. 
 21. The International Labor Organization Mandate, available at http://ww 
w.ilo.org/public/english/about/mandate.htm [hereinafter ILO Mandate]. 
 22. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935). 
 23. For example, the Freedom of Association is derived from the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution,  U.S. CONST. amend. I; the 
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1. Labor Rights in the United States 
Nothing explicitly resembling a labor right is to be found 
anywhere in the United States Constitution or the Bill of 
Rights.24  Instead, the beginning of the labor movement and the 
federalization of labor rights in the United States can be traced 
to the passage of the Clayton Act of 1914.25  The Clayton Act, 
responding to worker’s protests and unrest, exempted labor un-
ions from the Sherman Anti-trust Act’s prohibition of monopo-
lies and trusts.26  Yet, it was not until President Wilson’s War 
Labor Board that the federal government officially recognized 
the “right of workers to organize in trade unions and to bargain 
collectively through chosen representatives.”27  Though lacking 
enforcement provisions, subsequent Depression Era and New 
Deal governmental initiatives addressed labor issues and added 
protections by curbing the power of the courts to issue injunc-
tions and restraining orders against strikers.28  Finally, on July 
5, 1935, Senator Robert F. Wagner’s NLRA was signed into law, 
creating the first enforceable guarantee of labor rights in the 
United States.29  
The federalization of labor rights effected by the passage of 
the NLRA also put an end to the phenomenon known as the 
  
Freedom from Forced Labor is explicit in the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; and the Right to 
Equal Opportunity and Treatment is derived from the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–17 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 24. It has been argued that labor rights, though today accepted at the in-
ternational level as human rights, were never considered as such in the 
United States, and that American labor policy has and continues to suffer 
because of it.  See, e.g., James A. Gross, Human Rights Perspective on the 
United States Labor Relations Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of 
Association, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 65 (1999). 
 25. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2001).  See also Thomas I. Palley, The 
Economic Case for Labor Standards: A Layman’s Guide, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL. L. 
& BUS. 183 (Fall 2001).  
 26. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1994). 
 27. The First Sixty Years: The Story of the National Labor Relations Board 
(1935-1995) at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/first60yrs/60yrs_entirepub.h 
tml [hereinafter The First Sixty Years]. 
 28. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–05 (2002); National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–13 (West 2001)). 
 29. The First Sixty Years, supra note 27. 
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“race to the bottom.”30  At the beginning of the century, labor 
standards varied substantially from state to state in the United 
States.31  States which kept their labor standards low were more 
attractive to employers, and to compete states actually began to 
lower their standards.32  Labor began to organize and put pres-
sure on state governments to improve working conditions.  This 
pressure was quickly neutralized when employers threatened or 
actually did move to states with lower standards.  The economic 
interest of employers in the United States kept down and even 
lowered the abysmal labor conditions of employees, which fur-
ther deteriorated their social conditions and living standards 
generally.33  This “race to the bottom” persisted until the NLRA 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193834 were passed, feder-
alizing labor standards.  The pressure organized labor had kept 
on the federal government combined with a growing uneasiness 
about free-market economics generally to end the race to the 
bottom by raising the permitted bottom nationwide.35  Of course, 
the grant of these rights did not end organized labor’s struggle 
in the United States; as we shall see in the next section, many 
disputes, in and out of court, were to follow.   
2. International Labor Rights 
Perhaps one of the oldest continuously existing international 
organizations, the ILO was founded in 1919 under the Treaty of 
Versailles and became the first specialized agency of the UN in 
1946.36  In its Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, the ILO explicitly sets forth many of the basic labor 
rights delineated above: “freedom of association, the right to 
organize, collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor, and 
  
 30. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 2, at 992. 
 31. Bradley A. Harsch, Finding a Sound Commerce Clause Doctrine: Time 
to Evaluate the Structural Necessity of Federal Legislation, 31 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 983, 1015 (2001). 
 32. Id.  
 33. For a stark depiction of these effects, which would undoubtedly be con-
sidered today as mass human rights violations if nothing else, see UPTON 
SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1905).  
 34. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994). 
 35. Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, The American Experi-
ence with Labor Standards and Trade Agreements,  J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 41 (1999). 
 36. The ILO Mandate, supra note 21.  
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equality of opportunity and treatment.”37  However, its history 
has shown that violations are not easily remedied.38 
Complaints may be brought to the ILO through three mecha-
nisms.  A member state (and, importantly, not an individual) 
may bring a complaint under the ILO’s Article 26 Complaint 
Procedure if it feels another member state has failed to comply 
with the ILO Constitution.39  A commission is then formed and, 
if a violation is found, a report is issued to the offending state 
recommending it conform its practices to the ILO Constitution 
and relevant provisions.40  Theoretically, when an offending 
member state refuses to comply, the complaining member state 
may then refer the matter to the International Court of Justice, 
though this has never happened.  In fact, in its ninety-three 
years only six complaints brought under Article 26 have re-
sulted in the commission issuing a report.41  
The second mechanism for lodging complaints is through the 
ILO’s Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of 
Association (“FFCC”) and Committee on Freedom of Association 
(“CFA”).  The FFCC operates in a similar manner to the Article 
26 provisions, but only receives complaints relating to freedom 
of association violations which have been referred to it by the 
ILO’s Governing Body or the UN, not by individuals.  Further, 
complaints will not be considered without the violating state’s 
consent.42  
  
 37. Id. 
 38. For example, even violations of the prohibition on the worst forms of 
child labor cannot form the basis for suits in violation of the “law of nations,” 
as provided for in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).  These 
standards are neither the subject of treaties, nor so widely accepted so as to be 
considered customary law.  The prohibition on forced labor is an exception.  
However, plaintiffs have successfully sued under the Alien Tort Claims Act for 
labor-related violations involving forced labor along with torture, murder and 
rape.  See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Nat’l 
Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
 39. ILO Constitution, Chapter II, Article 26, (1948), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm.  See also ILO Explana-
tion of Article 26 Complaint Procedures, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/standards/norm/enforced/complnt/art26_2.htm#icj (last visited Oct. 1, 
2003). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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Finally, the CFA allows individuals and non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) such as trade unions to bring com-
plaints against member states for violating their freedom of as-
sociation.  Complaints may be brought to the CFA regardless of 
whether the offending member state has ratified the specific 
convention allegedly violated.  If a violation is found, a recom-
mendation is issued to the member state outlining what meas-
ures should be taken to conform its practices to the standards 
promulgated by the ILO.43  Although the CFA may “follow up” to 
see if recommendations have been enacted (and this only when 
the underlying convention has been ratified by the offending 
member state), the ILO lacks any enforcement mechanism to 
enforce compliance.  Instead, recommendations sit “on the 
books” for decades as the member state continues to violate the 
ILO Constitution and disregard the committee’s findings.44 
Under the ILO Constitution, every member state is obligated 
both to respect the rights delineated in the ILO charter and 
subsequent conventions in its own operations and to ensure 
that employers in its jurisdiction respect them.45  These obliga-
  
 43. Id. 
 44. E.g., CFA Case No. 1523, Complaint Against the Government of the 
United States Presented by the United Food and Commercial Workers Inter-
national Union (UFCW), The American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the International Federation of 
Commercial, Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees (FIET), ILO 
Report No. 284 (Vol. LXXV, 1992, Series B, No. 3).  This recommendation was 
issued in November of 1999 and the United States to this day has not even 
addressed how compliance might be brought about.  For a further discussion 
see Gross, supra note 24 (describing other United States labor laws which 
violate ILO standards).  See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: 
WORKER’S FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (Aug. 2000); Testimony of Kenneth 
Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch before the Senate Committee 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (June 20, 2002).  I will return to 
CFA Case 1523 infra Part II.B regarding the balancing necessary between 
labor and property rights.  
 45. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protec-
tion of the Right to Organise, Convention Number 87 (1948), art. 11 (“Each 
Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention 
is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to en-
sure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organize.”). 
See also CFA Case No. 1512, Complaint Against the Government of Guate-
mala Presented by The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) and the Latin American Central of Workers (CLAT) 3.10.1989 ILO 
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tions could be considered “negative” and “positive”: the former 
obligate the state to refrain from taking any official actions or 
passing or maintaining any laws that would violate ILO stan-
dards; the latter obligate the state to intervene in the activities 
of those within its jurisdiction to ensure that they also comply.  
Unfortunately, violations of both types are too commonly found 
by the ILO.46  While some governments are cited for direct viola-
tions of their negative obligations (e.g., carrying out illegal ar-
rests and detentions of union-organizers, or maintaining laws 
excluding workers from mandatory protections47), violations of 
positive obligations often involve failures to secure protections 
not readily recognized as labor-related, but which are nonethe-
less necessary for the full exercise of labor rights (e.g., failure to 
investigate or adjudicate death threats by non-governmental 
individuals, or to provide due process for complaints48).   
  
Report No. 275 (Vol. LXXIII, 1990, Series B, No. 3) at para. 398.  In this case, 
the CFA held that: 
[F]acts imputable to individuals do bring into play the State’s respon-
sibility owing to the State’s obligation to prevent violations of human 
rights. Consequently, governments should endeavour to meet their 
obligations regarding the respect of individual rights and freedoms, 
as well as their obligation to guarantee the right to life of trade un-
ionists. 
Id.  I will use the terms “positive” and “negative” to denote these two obliga-
tions throughout. 
 46. Compare id. at para. 394 (reminding government of Guatemala that 
the competent government authorities must recognize a local trade union), 
with CFA Case No. 1233, Complaint Against the Government of El Salvador 
Presented by The World Federation of Trade Union (WFTU) and the Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 27.9.1983, ILO Report No. 
233 (Vol. LXVII, 1984, Series B, No. 1), Interim Report (1983) at para. 682 
(reminding government of El Salvador that its responsibility is not only to 
respect human and labor rights in its own operations, but that “freedom of 
association can only be exercised in conditions in which fundamental human 
rights, and in particular those relating to human life and personal safety, are 
fully respected and guaranteed”). 
 47. See, e.g., CFA Case No. 1826, Complaint Against the Government of 
the Philippines, Presented by The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines 
(TUCP) 27.3.1995 ILO Report No. 302 (Vol. LXXIX, 1996, Series B, No. 1) 
(Illegal arrest and detention of trade union leaders; harassment, threats and 
acts of intimidation against trade union members by government officials and 
management in order to stop union activities). 
 48. See, e.g., CFA Case No. 1512, supra note 45, at para. 398. 
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Importantly, positive obligations impose upon governments 
responsibilities that are not limited to the workers and employ-
ers in their jurisdiction.  For example, putting an end to illegal 
arrests and summary executions of union organizers requires 
reforming the domestic police and judicial systems, something 
beyond simple labor law.49  Yet, expanded positive obligations 
are what the ILO must require to secure worker’s rights.50  It is 
also a glaring indication that labor rights are part of — and de-
pend on — a broader base of protections, including human and 
social rights for workers. 
As another example, the freedom of association is perhaps the 
most essential right given to workers because it allows for the 
fulfillment and exercise of all others labor rights.51  Indeed, the 
ability to keep workers from associating with one another 
and/or labor organizers has proven to be one of the most effec-
tive methods used by employers to keep their workers from or-
ganizing.52  Such practices stand as absolute obstacles to the 
  
 49. See, e.g., CFA Case No. 1233, supra note 46. 
 50. Id. 
 51. It could be argued that the freedom from forced labor is even more 
fundamental than the freedom of association or any of the other freedoms 
listed above.  However, this freedom is a ‘freedom from’ or negative freedom, 
that is, a guarantee to be free from the actions of others.  The other freedoms 
are ‘freedoms to’ or positive freedoms, that is, freedoms to be exercised by 
their possessors.  See Berlin, supra note 8.  This distinction is admittedly less 
than air-tight.  However, forced labor, akin to slavery and other crimes 
against humanity, is increasingly accepted as prohibited by customary inter-
national law, allowing for violations to be actionable under the Alien Torts 
Claim Act in the United States and other “law of nations” jurisdictional provi-
sions.  See e.g., Doe, 963 F. Supp. 880.  Since the prohibition of forced labor 
has become at least in that manner “enforceable,” I will concentrate on the 
other, positive liberties collected under the heading of labor rights. 
 52. See, e.g., CFA Case No. 2090, Complaint Against the Government of 
Belarus by The Belarus Automobile and Agricultural Machinery Workers’ 
Union (AAMWU), the Agricultural Sector Workers’ Union (ASWU), the Radio 
and Electronics Workers’ Union (REWU), the Congress of Democratic Trade 
Unions (CDTU), the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FPB), the Belaru-
sian Free Trade Union (BFTU), the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) and the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, 
Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF) 
16.6.2000 ILO Report No. 324 (Vol. LXXXIV, 2001, Series B, No. 1) (2000) at 
para. 205 (alleging government authorities interfered with trade union activi-
ties and elections, including denying access to the workplace to officers of the 
branch union). 
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improvement of labor conditions if ignored or enforced by the 
government.  Yet, these types of violations abound.53  In re-
sponse, the ILO is faced with the impossible situation of asking 
these governments to comply with internationally recognized 
labor rights when it is aware that the offending nation often 
has not the social, legal or economic infrastructure to do so.  
The respect of these rights is made impossible because there are 
no other relative rights or interests against which they could be 
balanced, and it is simply outside the ILO’s ability to require 
their creation. 
It is thus unsurprising that the ILO, though designated as 
the sole international organ responsible for the area, has had 
such difficulty in securing the basic labor rights to which it 
claims all workers are entitled.54  Enforcement devices other 
than the linkage systems which form the substance of this dis-
cussion have been equally ineffective in enforcing these stan-
dards.  While litigation brought by aggrieved parties under 
various municipal provisions has been somewhat effective in 
remedying those particular transgressions for which there is 
jurisdiction, it cannot be a viable means of broad-based regula-
tion.55  Such ad hoc litigation only applies to certain, limited 
types of breaches and is not pervasive enough to be a deterrent 
or incentive for governments to respect labor standards.  A “bot-
tom-up” approach has also been proposed in the form of inter-
national unionization of the labor forces under a particular in-
ternational corporation or within a particular industry.56  This 
approach faces obstacles as well.  For instance, workers are of-
ten kept in isolated areas, cordoned off by barbed wire and 
armed guards, making it impossible for union organizers to 
  
 53. Id. 
 54. See Jean-Michel Servais, Labor Law and Cross-Border Cooperation 
among Unions, in TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS, 44, 56–59 
(Michael E. Gordon & Lowell Turner eds., 2000); See also The Realization of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR Sub-Comm. on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 47th Sess., Item 8., U.N 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995//11 at para. 108 [hereinafter The Realization of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights]. 
 55. See e.g., Doe, 963 F. Supp. 880; Doe v. Exxon Mobile, No. 01–1357 
(D.D.C. filed June 20, 2001).  For a discussion of various campaigns brought in 
courts, see also Legal Initiatives for Corporate Accountability at http://www. 
laborrights.org/projects/corporate/index.html.  
 56. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 2, at 1007–08. 
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physically reach them, much less assist in organizing them into 
collective bargaining units.57  
The need for an enforceable system of international labor 
standards has become all the more dire in the increasingly 
competitive global labor market.58  Like that which arose in the 
early part of the twentieth century among the various states in 
the United States, there is fear that a new “race to the bottom” 
will begin (if it has not started already), now involving competi-
tion between nations in the global labor market. 59  Particularly 
since the advent of EPZs, host counties — usually those consid-
ered “developing” — have used their cheap and plentiful labor 
resources to attract foreign investors, usually from developed 
countries.  This has created a competitive market among coun-
tries that is governed by the same incentives to lower labor 
standards as were found in the United States at the beginning 
of the Twentieth Century.60  Those concerned with this devel-
opment have looked to the ILO for a global analogue to the fed-
eral government to set out and enforce standards for all na-
tions, thus raising the bottom worldwide.  However, stark dif-
ferences exist among the legal systems found in the United 
States and in the states the ILO often finds in breach of its 
  
 57. Dorsati Madani, The World Bank, A Review of the Role and Impact of 
Export Processing Zones (1999), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/ wbie 
p/trade/othertrade/files/MadaniEPZ.pdf. 
 58. See, e.g., ILO, Tripartite Meeting on Labour Practices in the Footwear, 
Leather, Textiles and Clothing Industries, Geneva, 16-20 October 2000 para. 
5, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmlfi 
00/tmlfin.htm (discussing competition in these industries creating a “race to 
the bottom” for worker’s wages and conditions). 
 59. See id.; The Race to the Bottom, National Labor Commission, at 
http://www.nlcnet.org/brochure/page1.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2000). 
 60. EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ORGANISATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL 
POLICY- OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 43: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CORE LABOUR 
STANDARDS: A SURVEY OF THE RECENT LITERATURE 21–24 (2000), available at 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/c5ce8ffa41835d64c125685d005300b0/ 
c125692700623b74c125696e0056ca76/$FILE/00083851.DOC.  See also ILO, 
DECENT WORK RESEARCH PROGRAMME, THE EFFECTS OF CORE WORKERS RIGHTS 
ON LABOUR COSTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: EVALUATING THE 
“CONVENTIONAL WISDOM” (2001) (arguing that even if, as some studies sug-
gest, countries with lower labor standards have not in fact attracted more 
foreign direct investment than those with higher labor standards, the percep-
tion among countries competing in the global labor market that they do is 
enough to warrant fears of a “race to the bottom”). 
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standards.  To understand the difference will be to understand 
why the ILO alone is insufficient to secure these rights.  
II. BALANCING LABOR AND OTHER RIGHTS: DIFFICULTIES HERE 
AND ABROAD 
The ability to weigh competing interests asserted by employ-
ers and employees has proven essential to the effective en-
forcement of labor rights.  Inherent in striking that balance is 
the recognition of the interdependence of these interests.  How-
ever, the governments of developing countries tend to be more 
sympathetic (if not in a symbiotic relationship) with employers.  
Even where there is some semblance of governmental imparti-
ality, the just balance between the two is not an uncontroversial 
issue.  Observing how this essential balance has been struck in 
the United States, the problems facing other nations (and facing 
the ILO in addressing their violations) become apparent.   
A. Balancing Labor and Other Rights in the United States: Bab-
cock and Lechmere  
As explored above,61 in the United States, labor rights are not 
direct constitutional protections, but are the product of eco-
nomic and political pressures, and thus have often been 
trumped by other, longer-established rights.  Ten years after 
the passage of the NLRA and the creation of the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”), the Supreme Court was asked to 
consider whether employers could prohibit their employees from 
distributing and receiving unionizing information to one an-
other on the employer’s property.62  In Republic Aviation Corp. 
v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that the employees’ right to 
self-organize, as guaranteed under the NLRA, was more essen-
tial than the employer’s right to control the use of his property.63  
The Court affirmed the Board’s decision that the employer’s 
prohibition of the distribution of union information on its prem-
ises constituted an “unreasonable impediment on the freedom of 
communication essential to the exercise of its employees’ right 
  
 61. See supra Part I.B. 
 62. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
 63. Id. at 801. 
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to self-organization.”64  However, the Court made clear that this 
decision applied only to the exercise of rights by employees. 
In 1956, the Supreme Court was asked to strike a similar 
balance, this time between an employer’s right to exclude non-
employees from its property and an employee’s freedom of asso-
ciation.  NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.65 combined several fac-
tually similar NLRB cases for appeal on this question.  In the 
case actually involving Babcock & Wilcox Co. (Babcock), the 
United Steelworkers of America, CIO (USA) had been trying to 
organize employees that worked at a factory, owned by their 
employer, on an isolated one hundred acre tract of land.66  Al-
most all of the employees drove to work and parked in a com-
pany lot next to the fenced-in plant area.  The parking lot could 
be reached only by a one hundred yard-long driveway connect-
ing it to a public highway.67  This driveway was mostly on com-
pany-owned land, except where it crossed a thirty-one foot-wide 
public right-of-way adjoining the highway.  Union organizers 
had been attempting to distribute literature from this right-of-
way.68  Babcock had claimed the unconditional right to exclude 
all non-employees from its property, including these non-
employee organizers.   
The Supreme Court observed that, “[o]rganization rights are 
granted to workers by the same authority, the National Gov-
ernment, that preserves property rights.  Accommodation be-
tween the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one 
as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.”69  Neither 
property nor organizational rights are to be considered complete 
or absolute, and one will have to yield to the other.  The Court 
went on to find that while “[n]o restriction may be placed on the 
employees’ right to discuss self-organization among them-
selves…no such obligation is owed nonemployee organizers.”70  
Instead, “an employer may validly post his property against 
nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable ef-
forts by the union through other available channels of commu-
  
 64. LeTourneau Co. of Georgia, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944).  
 65. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
 66. Id. at 106–07. 
 67. Id. at 107. 
 68. Id. at 107. 
 69. Id. at 112. 
 70. Id. at 113 (emphasis in original). 
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nication will enable it to reach the employees with its mes-
sage.”71   
The Court reached this decision by maintaining a distinction 
between the rights given to employees and the rights given to 
non-employee organizers.  Though it recognized that “the right 
to exclude from property has been required to yield to the ex-
tent needed to permit the communication of information on the 
right to organize” in circumstance in which “the inaccessibility 
of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-
employees to communicate with them through the usual chan-
nels,”72 it did not find the situation at bar to be such a case.  The 
Court’s decision thus constituted a victory for employers, allow-
ing them to prohibit union organizers except in the most ex-
treme circumstances. 
The “alternative channels of communication” test pronounced 
by the Court remained in effect for over fifty years before the 
Supreme Court revisited the issue.  In 1992, the Supreme Court 
was again asked to determine whether an employer could ex-
clude non-employee union organizers from its property in 
Lechmere, Inc., v. NLRB.73  The question in this case was the 
nature of the circumstances required for the application of the 
Babcock exception.74  In Lechmere, the location of the work site 
and employees’ living arrangements were less remote than 
those in Babcock: the worksite was a retail store on a major 
highway and the workers lived in a nearby metropolitan area.75  
The case could easily have been decided upon the rule enunci-
ated in Babcock.  Yet, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, 
seized upon the occasion to unnecessarily narrow the ruling in 
Babcock to apply only,  
where the location of a plant and living quarters of the em-
ployees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable 
union efforts to communicate with them.  Classic examples in-
clude logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort ho-
tels … where employees, by virtue of their employment, are 
  
 71. Id. at 112. 
 72. Id. at 113. 
 73. Lechmere, Inc., v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 74. Id. at 529. 
 75. Id. at 529, 540. 
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isolated from the ordinary flow of information that character-
izes our society.76 
The Court thus pared back an already narrow rule to apply 
only to the most truly remote employment locations.  The Court 
struck the balance such that an employer’s property right 
trumps the right of employees to learn from and be reached by 
non-employee organizers unless it is absolutely impossible to 
reach them otherwise.  This sacrifice of labor rights to property 
rights has not gone unnoticed.77  Indeed, in his dissenting opin-
ion Justice White notes that  
If employees are entitled to learn from others the advantages 
of self-organization, it is singularly unpersuasive to suggest 
that the union has sufficient access for this purpose by being 
able to hold up signs from a public grassy strip adjacent to the 
highway leading to the parking lot.”78   
Non-employee organizers have proven indispensable because, 
unlike employees, they do not depend on the employer for their 
livelihood and are unafraid to take the initial steps toward or-
ganizing.  However, for their activities to be fruitful, they must 
have access to the workers in person, not just the ability to 
communicate or publish to them from afar.  It is not an issue of 
freedom of speech or press, but of freedom of association, and it 
is, after all, the association that is essential.79   
Nonetheless, the Babcock exception, as narrowed in Lech-
mere, remains the law of the United States.  While in substance 
there is plenty which could be criticized,80 these cases are impor-
tant for this discussion for a number of other reasons.  First, the 
Court’s analysis in each finds labor rights as spheres of non-
interference, enmeshed in a legal framework occupied by other 
competing rights and interests, such as the employer’s property 
  
 76. Id. at 539. 
 77. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 24, at 94. 
 78. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 534 (White, J., dissenting). 
 79. Property rights and freedom of speech have found themselves in con-
flict in areas other than labor rights disputes. See, e.g.,  Pruneyard v. Robins, 
447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 80. The purpose of this paper is not to critique U.S. labor policy, though 
this can certainly be done with respect to the Lechmere decision and other 
policies.  See generally Gross, supra note 24.  See also Michael J. Wishnie, 
Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement of International Labor 
Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529 (2002). 
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right to exclude.  The claimants of these rights and interests 
stand in the same relation to the Court.  The only question is 
what should be done when the two rights are incompatible, 
when the exercise of one frustrates or denies the exercise of the 
other.  The Court attempts to resolve the conflict by allowing 
the exercise of one except when it would make the exercise of 
the other impossible, not merely inconvenient or inefficient.   
This rather simple and familiar analysis utterly depends on 
the availability of other rights, namely property rights, to be 
scaled back in accommodation of the competing labor rights.  As 
such, this balancing explicitly recognizes the interdependence of 
these rights.  Yet this recognition is not easily found outside of 
the United States.  Without it, international labor regulation 
remains hamstrung. 
B. Balancing Labor and Other Rights at International Law: ILO 
Complaints 
In 1992 the United Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) 
and the AFL-CIO filed a claim against the government of the 
United States with the ILO’s CFA, charging, among other com-
plaints, that the Lechmere decision would have “a devastating 
impact on freedom of association rights for workers in the 
United States” and that it had “struck down all recent NLRB 
precedents which maintained a balance between organisational 
rights provided for in section 7 of the NLRA and property inter-
ests.”81  The UFCW argued that the Supreme Court had “de-
clared that private property will assume absolute priority over 
rights of freedom of association, whenever union organisers are 
involved.”82  After considering the matter, the CFA agreed with 
the UFCW and issued a recommendation which included a re-
quest that the United States “guarantee access of trade union 
representatives to workplaces, with due respect for the rights of 
property and management, so that trade unions can communi-
cate with workers, in order to apprise them of the potential ad-
vantages of unionization.”83  
  
 81. CFA Case No. 1523, supra note 44, at 36, 40. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 55.  The United States has taken no steps to adopt these recom-
mendations, nor, as noted supra I.C, does the ILO have any enforcement 
mechanism. 
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While in this case the CFA’s language resembles the Supreme 
Court’s balancing approach (just tipping the balance in the 
other direction), this has more to do with the domestic law of 
the United States than the jurisprudence of the ILO.  In its rec-
ommendations, the CFA “requests the Government to guarantee 
access of trade union representatives to workplaces.”84  The CFA 
thus appeals to the government’s positive obligations under the 
ILO Convention and relevant charters “to take all necessary 
and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employ-
ers may exercise freely the right to organise.”85  This type of ap-
peal is possible because there exists in the United States the 
legal framework which would allow the enactment of these re-
forms.  For example, had the Supreme Court held the other way 
in Lechmere, or had Congress subsequently enacted legislation 
bringing the labor laws of the United States into compliance 
with the ILO, such measures would not have enlarged worker’s 
labor rights per se, but instead would have curtailed employer’s 
property rights.  This takes for granted what cannot be in other 
nations, namely, that a system of property rights exists which 
allows the government, in discharging its positive obligations, 
to ensure the employer’s compliance. 
III. THE CHALLENGE OF EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES  
In answering complaints against governments with various 
rights regimes, the type of balancing test used in Babcock and 
Lechmere is usually not available or useful to the ILO.  It would 
be beyond the scope of the present discussion to explore the var-
ied private property regimes and legal systems in effect in the 
many countries the ILO has found to be in violation of freedom 
of association principles.  However, it is informative to examine 
how the ILO has dealt with an extreme case, EPZs.  In such 
remote situations, often found around mines, plantations, and 
textile and electronics factories, it seems even the narrowed 
Lechmere rule would apply.  In many of these situations, the 
entire worksite and surrounding area is separated from the rest 
  
 84. CFA Case No. 1523, supra note 44, at 40 (emphasis added). 
 85. ILO Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protec-
tion of the Right to Organise, art. 11, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (July 9, 1998). 
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of the community.86  Yet, not only are there no local union or-
ganizers to reach the workers, but unions from other nations 
are kept out, often forcibly, by the employer and/or the govern-
ment.  How the ILO has attempted to deal with such extreme 
situations will therefore be instructive as to why the ILO has 
been ineffective (on its own) in bringing such violating countries 
into compliance with its standards.87 
A. A Brief History and Definition of EPZs 
The first EPZ is often traced to a tax- and custom-free zone 
created around the airport in Shannon, Ireland in 1959.88  In the 
1970s, EPZs began springing up in every corner of the globe.89  
An EPZ can be defined as “a clearly delineated industrial estate 
which constitutes a free trade enclave in the customs and trade 
regime of a country, and where foreign manufacturing firms 
producing mainly for export benefit from a certain number of 
fiscal and financial incentives.”90  Most often EPZs are strictly 
separated from the rest of the host country, surrounded by 
fences, barbwire and/or armed guards.91  Non-employees are 
strictly excluded from the property.92  By keeping the EPZ sepa-
rated from the rest of the nation, the government of the host 
country can control (and restrict) “osmosis between the EPZs 
and the host nation.”93  To some degree necessary to guard 
against smuggling, this controlled segregation and insulation 
  
 86. ILO, SECTORAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAMME, TRIPARTITE MEETING ON LABOUR 
PRACTICES IN THE FOOTWEAR, LEATHER, TEXTILES AND CLOTHING INDUSTRIES, 
GENEVA, 16-20 OCT. 2000, NOTE ON THE PROCEEDINGS para. 28, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmlfi00/tmlfin.htm 
(noting that because EPZs were traditionally set up “outside the purview of 
national laws and practices the result was a second class ‘country’ within a 
country”).  
 87. Of course the question then arises whether an ideal but unenforceable 
policy is better than an imperfect but enforceable one. 
 88. Michael Gordon, Export Processing Zones, in TRANSNATIONAL COOPE- 
RATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS 66 (Michael Gordon & Lowell Turner eds., 2000). 
 89. Id. 
 90. International Labor Organization/United Nations Centre on Transna-
tional Zones, Economic and Social Effects of Multinational Enterprises in 
Export Processing Zones (1988) cited in The Realization of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, supra note 54, at 85. 
 91. Id. at 65; MADANI, supra note 57, at 64. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
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also chokes off the potential benefit that might flow from the 
EPZ back to the host nation (often referred to as “backward 
linkage”94) and keeps the laws of the host nation from extending 
to the EPZ.95  
B. One Unfulfilled Promise of EPZs: “Backward Linkage” 
As conceived by the IMF, World Bank, ILO and other inter-
national financial organizations, EPZs have several long- and 
short-term goals.96  First, in the short-term, EPZs are supposed 
to bring jobs to countries long mired in poverty and unemploy-
ment.97  It is clear that most EPZs have proven extremely effec-
tive in achieving this short term goal.98  Even though valid criti-
cisms may be voiced regarding the type of jobs gained, their ef-
fect on other industries in the host country, and the conditions 
of employment at those jobs, it is beyond dispute that employ-
ment rates in host countries have risen remarkably since they 
introduced the EPZ.99   
Second, in the short- and, hopefully, long-term, EPZs are de-
signed to bring foreign direct investment to countries with his-
torically little trade activity and improve their participation in 
exchange and export agreements.100  In the main, EPZs have 
been so successful in achieving this goal that candidates for of-
fice in countries facing low foreign investment often campaign 
with promises to create EPZs if elected.101 
  
 94. ILO, BUREAU FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE ACTIVITIES, EXPORT 
PROCESSING ZONES: ADDRESSING THE SOCIAL AND LABOUR ISSUES, at http://www. 
transnationale.org/pays/epz.htm (last visited on Sept. 27, 2003). 
 95. MADANI, supra note 57, at 43–50. 
 96. SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAMME ON SOCIAL AND LABOUR ISSUES IN EXPORT 
PROCESSING ZONES, LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR RELATIONS BRANCH, ILO, SPECIAL 
ACTION PROGRAMME ON SOCIAL AND LABOUR ISSUES IN EXPORT PROCESSING 
ZONES  [hereinafter ISSUES IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES], WHY SET UP AN 
EPZ?, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/govlab/legrel/tc/epz/setup. 
htm (last visited on Sept. 27, 2003) (Setting out these three main and other 
related objectives for EPZs). 
 97. Id. 
 98. But see MADANI, supra note 57, at 34 (noting that while highly success-
ful in creating jobs in some host countries, EPZs have often exacerbated un-
employment rates in host countries by forcing out other would-be employers).   
 99. Id. at 35. 
 100. Id. at 34. 
 101. Id. 
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Finally, this influx of trade and investment is meant to “fos-
ter linkages between foreign and local enterprises and indus-
tries”102 and stimulate the economies of developing countries by 
having the benefits of the export-specific industries flow back 
into the rest of the economy.103  Unfortunately, EPZs have thus 
far failed remarkably in achieving this long-term goal.104 
Various reasons have been given as to why there has been 
such minimal backward linkage.  First, the types of products 
manufactured in EPZs are generally to be sold in highly indus-
trialized markets and so “bear little if any relation to the needs 
or requirements of the people of the host country.”105  Aside from 
the products not being desirable (or legal) in domestic markets, 
the skills learned by the workers in the EPZ are also unlikely to 
be transferable to non-EPZ employment.  Second, the work done 
in EPZs generally does not rely on materials found in the host 
country.106  There is therefore little opportunity for the EPZs to 
spin off support industries and markets.107  Third, most EPZs 
have remained fenced-off enclaves with little physical connec-
tion to the host country, keeping the infrastructure supporting 
the EPZ from reaching or benefiting the host country.108  Fourth, 
the governments of the EPZ host countries, typically the only 
entities that can take advantage of opportunities for fostering 
backward linkages, have not done so.109  
  
 102. Id. See also Press Release, ILO, Export Processing Zones Growing 
Steadily Providing a Major Source of Job Creation: Labor/Productivity Prob-
lems Continue to Mount, ILO to Hold Tripartite Meeting of Experts, Sept. 28, 
1998, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/1998/34.htm.  
 103. MADANI, supra note 57, at 30–34. 
 104. Gordon, supra note 88, at 69. 
 105. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 
54, at para. 59. 
 106. MADANI, supra note 57, at 64. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. ISSUES IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES, ARE THEY EFFECTIVE?, available 
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/govlab/legrel/tc/epz/effectiv.htm (l 
ast visited Oct. 1, 2003).  The ILO provides the following anecdote to illustrate 
the role government can play in fostering backward linkages.  
For example, hard disc manufacturers in one country we visited can-
not find a local dry cleaner capable of washing the overalls used in 
clean rooms, and they are therefore forced to fly the overalls to Sin-
gapore to be cleaned to the required specifications. There should be 
an agency which identifies such potential links and assists local en-
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Perhaps the greatest obstacle to effective backward linkage is 
also the greatest financial incentive that attracts foreign pro-
ducers to EPZs: cheap wage labor.  Many EPZs are used pri-
marily for their labor, such as when United States corporations 
ship component parts to EPZs only for them to be assembled 
and returned.  Competition among EPZs has thus centered on 
labor costs, keeping labor standards low and working condi-
tions, more often than not, abysmal.110  Pollution, hazardous 
conditions and “catastrophic industrial accidents” are common-
place.111  Long hours result in “burn-out” at an early age.112  This, 
coupled with a decrease in alternative domestic employers, re-
sults in a general downturn in the overall quality of life for em-
ployees.113 
These labor conditions are present even where the laws or 
regulations of the host country prohibit such conditions outside 
the EPZ.  Indeed, EPZs run by governments are often explicitly 
exempt from these regulations,114 and even when they are not, 
the working standards inside the EPZ rarely conform to those 
required by the domestic law.115  Employers either ignore com-
plaints of violations or do not have sufficient resources or per-
sonnel to address them.116  Denial of freedom of association and 
union participation is often even advertised to would-be manu-
facturers to attract their business.117  Where the law does not 
explicitly forbid freedom of association, the physical isolation of 
  
terprises to procure the technology and skills required to supply zone 
investors. 
Id. 
 110. Gordon, supra note 88, at 71.  See also, CFA Case No. 1480, Complaint 
Against The Government of Malaysia Presented by the International Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the Malaysian Trades Union Con-
gress (MTUC), 72 ILO Report No: 265 (Vol. LXXII, 1989, Series B, No.2) at 
para. 585 (noting that government’s sudden decision not to allow for a union 
in the electronics sector was probably taken under pressure from foreign in-
vestors in that sector). 
 111. Id. See also The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
supra note 54, at para. 61. 
 112. Id. at paras. 53, 108. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Gordon, supra note 88, at 73 (citing INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, 
WORLD BANK, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (1992)). 
 115. Gordon, supra note 88, at 73–4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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the EPZ precludes non-employee union organizers from reach-
ing the employees.118  EPZ employers also refuse to hire employ-
ees that are known to be union organizers,119 and deny non-
employee organizers access to the EPZ area.120  Thus, de jure or 
de facto, the laws of the host nation do not reach into the EPZ.  
Inevitably, when labor rights are denied on economic grounds, 
other human rights violations are not unusual.121 
C. Labor and Property Rights in EPZs 
Traditionally EPZs have been entirely owned, operated, and 
controlled by the host government.122  This has meant that the 
property status of the territory of the EPZ has remained rather 
ambiguous.  The land is considered government or public land, 
outside of private interest, and the government retains com-
plete and unconditional control.  The land is then rented by the 
government to manufacturers that wish to set up operations 
there.123  Offering such services relieves foreign investors of the 
burden of having to “master the intricacies of the local real es-
tate and construction markets, if they exist.”124  However the 
physical area has consequently remained something of a no-
man’s land, where the normal rights and responsibilities that 
attend property ownership do not necessarily apply.  Instead, 
through the conditions of their leases with the government, EPZ 
developers may be exempted from many of those regulations 
  
 118. Id. at 75. 
 119. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 
54, at para. 65. 
 120. ILO, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, GENERAL REPORT para. 110 (1999), available at http://ww 
w.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&docment=14
&chapter=4&query=epz&highlight=on&querytype=bool&context=0#1. 
 121. See, e.g., Anti-Union Repression Still on the Rise Worldwide, ICFTU 
Online, (June 18, 2002), at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index= 
991216 167&Language=EN&Printout=Yes (reporting anti-union crack-downs 
in various EPZs involving illegal and brutal arrests, imprisonment and even 
murder). 
 122. Id. at 67. 
 123. See, e.g., Export Processing Zones Act, (ACT No. XXXVI OF 1980) as 
modified up to Dec. 1994, § 7(a) (Bangl.), available at http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/ 
E94BGD01.htm. 
 124. Peter L. Watson, Export Processing Zones: Has Africa Missed the Boat? 
Not Yet!, 17 AFRICA REGION WORKING PAPER SERIES 11 (May 2001), available 
at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp17.pdf. 
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that would apply to host country property owners125 and few (if 
any) responsibilities vis-à-vis their workers.   
Once workers enter the EPZ, it is not exactly that they are 
stripped of their protections — indeed, the ILO Convention ex-
tends its protections to all peoples, even if their government has 
not ratified the treaty.126  Rather, these protections become 
meaningless against the absolute rights of their employer.127  
With the employer in such a close, practically symbiotic rela-
tionship with the government, the employee is put in an impos-
sible position.  In such a situation, how can the ILO demand 
that labor rights be respected where there is no legal system to 
protect them?128 
Let us return briefly to Justice Reed’s observation in Babcock 
that “[o]rganization rights are granted to workers by the same 
authority, the national government, that preserves property 
rights.  Accommodation between the two must be obtained with 
as little destruction of one as is consistent with the mainte-
nance of the other.”129  The important point in this context is 
  
 125. For example, in Bangladesh and Pakistan, local EPZ legislation explic-
itly exempts employers in EPZs from labor protections and prohibits the exer-
cise of rights (e.g., to organize) granted to workers in the host country.  Ser-
vais, supra note 54 at 47; Export Processing Zones Authority Ordinance, § 4 
(1980) (Pak.) (PAK-1980-L-50073) (prohibiting strikes in the EPZ); Bangla-
desh Export Processing Zones Authority Act, § 11(a)(f), (ACT No. XXXVI OF 
1980) (1980) (Bangl.) (exempting EPZ employers from, among other laws, The 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969)). 
 126. ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEMBER 
STATE OBLIGATIONS, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/howu 
sed/obligats/ index.htm (last visited Sept. 27 2003). 
 127. Anti-Union Repression Still on the Rise Worldwide, International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions, June 18, 2002, available at http://www.icf 
tu.org/displaydocument.asp?Indes=991216167Language=EN&Printout=Yes.h
tm. 
 128. See, e.g., CFA Case No. 1289, Complaint Presented by the Employees’ 
Union of Esperanza Del Peru S.A. — Clinica San Borja Against the Govern-
ment of Peru, ILO Report No. 238, (Vol. LXVIII, 1985, Series B, No.1) (alleg-
ing police intervention on the pretext of protecting the property of the under-
taking, in order to intimidate the workers); CFA Case No. 1300, Complaint 
Presented by the World Federation of Trade Unions Against the Government 
of Costa Rica, ILO Report No:238, (Vol. LXVIII, 1985, Series B, No.1) (alleging 
orders were given to the police to guarantee the continuation of work, ensur-
ing the safety of workers who did not wish to join the strike and protecting the 
property of the Banana Company of Costa Rica).  
 129. Babcock, 351 U.S at 112.  
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that the property owner and worker, along with their respective 
rights, should stand in the same relation to the government.  A 
court is then able to balance their rights against one another.  
Yet in EPZs, the worker’s right of association stands in a void, 
unbalanced and unbalanceable.  This continues to be the situa-
tion, at least in government-controlled EPZs. 
D. Private EPZ Ownership: Toward Integration and Rights  
Systems 
Time and experience have begun to show that governments 
are inefficient EPZ managers.130  Government-controlled zones, 
which tend to be strictly closed off from the host country, have 
seen the least amount of backward linkage.131  Further, when 
governments both manage the EPZ and look for incentives to 
compete with other EPZ hosts, they are more likely to agree to 
ban union activity, lower the minimum wage, or make other 
concessions to investors that are not in the best interests of 
their workers.132 
Spurred by international and domestic pressure to improve 
their efficiency (and labor conditions), many countries have be-
gun to privatize their EPZ operations.133  Some countries have 
delegated the management of the EPZ to a government com-
mission which may then designate any land, public or private, 
an EPZ.  The commission may then assign an EPZ developer to 
sell or lease the land to private or public firms.134  While some 
have argued that governments should take an entirely hands-
off approach,135 a consensus has formed that governments 
should keep intervention to a minimum, that is, stay only as 
involved as is necessary to maintain an efficient and stable de-
sign, provide the legal framework and bureaucracy necessary to 
encourage private investment, and ensure compliance.136 
Perhaps the greatest advantage to privatizing an EPZ is that 
it no longer remains an enclave separate and apart from the 
  
 130. MADANI, supra note 57, at 66. 
 131. Id. at 67. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Export Processing Zone Act, Ch. 232B(6) (Belize). 
 135. See, e.g., Sergio Bermudez, The Case for Private Free Zones in PUBLIC 
VS. PRIVATE FREE TRADE ZONES (Richard L. Bolin ed., 1993). 
 136. MADANI, supra note 57, at 68–69. 
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rest of the host country.  As it is opened to private industry, the 
EPZ area retains the customs and duty exemptions that make it 
attractive to foreign investments, but becomes reintegrated into 
the host country’s legal, economic and social systems, increasing 
opportunities for backward linkages.137   
Reintegration opens many opportunities for the host country, 
such as providing the services that improved labor conditions 
will require.138  As a recent World Bank report on EPZs in Africa 
notes, “[i]n Panama, in the Dominican Republic, and in Tangi-
ers, EPZ management is private and has responded well in 
terms of providing the requisite facilities and services.”139  In 
contrast “in Africa, where public sector management has a poor 
track record in providing facilities and services, it would be pru-
dent to insist upon private management for EPZs — either by 
concessioning the development and management of the EPZ or, 
at least, by contracting out its management.”140   
Ironically, while many advocates for better conditions and 
rights within EPZs come at the problem from a socialist tact,141 
some persuasive arguments have been made that a strong re-
gime of property rights may be essential not only to improve 
labor conditions but to open opportunities for greater democra-
tization, wealth distribution and prosperity in general.142  For 
example, the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto has argued 
that property rights systems are necessary preconditions for 
capital markets to work.143  By allowing individuals to lay claim 
  
 137. Id. at 77. 
 138. For example, the Mauritius EPZ has begun to offer day care for the 
children of workers, provided by citizens of the host country.  Day Care Cen-
ters in Mauritius, World Bank, at http://www.worldbank.org/children/africa/k 
ampala/epzmaur.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2003).  Such programs provide 
backward linkages both in terms of improving the conditions of the workers 
and providing for parasitic employment opportunities for the host country’s 
other citizens. 
 139. Watson, supra note 124. 
 140. Id.  
 141. See, e.g., Liz Mantell, Bangladesh Government Spends on Investors 
Rather than Hospitals and Schools, World Socialist Website, International 
Committee of the Fourth International, Apr. 3, 1999, available at http://www. 
sws.org/articles/1999/apr1999/bang-a03.shtml. 
 142. Interview with Hernando De Soto, Public Broadcast System, Mar. 30-
31, 2001, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/ 
minitextlo/int_hernandodesoto.html. 
 143. Id. 
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to intangible financial titles (credit, securities, mortgages, etc.) 
a robust property system gives the traditionally disenfranchised 
a way to improve their conditions without requiring a substan-
tial initial asset base.144  Unfortunately, countries in the devel-
oping world rarely have such systems.  Instead, the state owns 
and controls most if not all property, and the people in such 
states have few opportunities to grow or develop; the transitory 
nature of the verb “developing” as applied to such nations is 
rendered suspect where the possibility of making that transi-
tion is foreclosed.145 
To bring De Soto’s argument to bear on the problem at hand, 
when EPZs remain owned and controlled by governments, the 
government dispossesses both EPZ workers and other citizens 
of their rights.  Privatizing EPZs in a sense democratizes them 
by fostering responsible property regimes, social programs, 
worker’s protections and other reforms.  Early evidence gives 
reason to be hopeful.  Privatization of EPZs “shows a positive 
link between freedom of association and better economic stabil-
ity and productivity by improving the motivation of workers” 
and promotes “sustainable distribution of income and wealth.”146  
Where governments, instead of cordoning off the EPZ zone with 
soldiers and barbed wire, provide the physical and social infra-
structure needed to make the zone more efficient and competi-
tive, worker’s conditions inside (and the social conditions out-
side the EPZ) improve.   
This provides hope, at least, that privatization will extend the 
legal regimes of the host country to the EPZ just as the eco-
nomic benefits of the EPZ extend to the host country.  Reinte-
grated EPZs would thus place workers and employers in the 
same relationship to the government.  This would benefit the 
workers in terms of improved conditions, the host country 
through better distribution of wealth, and would be done with-
out removing the economic benefits for employers.   
  
 144. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN 
THE THIRD WORLD 12 (June Abbott trans., Harper & Row, 1989). 
 145. Id. at 244–45. 
 146. International Labor Conference, Provisional Record, ILO, 88th Sess., 
6th Sit., Agenda Item 11 (2000), at 5, available at http://www.ilo.org/pub-
lic/engl ish/standards/relm/ilc/ilc88/pdf/pr-11-am.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2003). 
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IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE ILO: INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
The variety of factors at play in the success of reintegrating 
EPZs (themselves a heterogeneous bunch) into their host coun-
tries (which are equally diverse in their legal, social and eco-
nomic situations) precludes, at least in this context, making 
sharp conclusions about the total effects of EPZ reintegration.  
However, in the sort of laboratory EPZs provide, we see labor 
rights abused when removed from social and legal systems, and 
protected when reintegrated.  The ILO’s experience with EPZ 
violators demonstrates that workers suffer when their govern-
ments do not balance their labor rights against the competing 
rights of their employers.  Having no power over the interests 
which infringe labor rights, the ILO is unable to remedy these 
violations.  
A. The Negative and Positive Obligations 
Though at first glance they appear to be the most troubling 
cases, those countries which explicitly allow for labor rights vio-
lations in their EPZs are perhaps the easiest to address in 
terms of legal obligations.  For example, Pakistan had, since the 
CFA began issuing recommendations in 1983, maintained laws 
explicitly exempting EPZs from the labor protections extended 
to workers in the host country.147  Unionizing and striking were 
banned in its EPZs, all of which were government-owned under-
takings.148  In one of its many recommendations the ILO repri-
manded the Pakistani government, reminding them that “Arti-
cle 2 of Convention No. 87…provides that workers without dis-
tinction whatsoever shall have the right to establish organisa-
tions of their own choosing.”149  The ILO requested that the gov-
ernment amend its laws to include EPZ workers in their labor 
protections and  refrain from such activities as would be incon-
sistent with what we have called its “negative” obligations. 150  
However, Pakistan continued to ignore the ILO’s demands.151   
  
 147. CFA Case No. 1353, Complaint Against the Government of Pakistan 
Presented by The Trade Unions Action Committee (TUAC) ILO Report No: 
253 (Vol. LXX, 1987, Series B, No.3). 
 148. Id. at para. 84. 
 149. Id. at para. 92. 
 150. CFA Case No. 1726, Complaint against the Government of Pakistan 
presented by the International Federation of Building and Wood Workers 
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After years of violations and repeated ILO declarations that it 
“deplore[d] that the Government violated its obligations arising 
from Conventions Nos. 87 and 98,”152 in 2000, the ILO finally 
threatened to request the World Bank and IMF to suspend as-
sistance to Pakistan if it continued to maintain laws that de-
nied freedom of association to workers in EPZ and other indus-
tries.153  While there are no direct accounts of the effect this 
warning had on the government’s policy position, it is probably 
no coincidence that shortly thereafter Pakistan announced to 
the ILO that it would redraft its laws concerning EPZs to allow 
unionizing and otherwise take action to conform their laws to 
the relevant ILO resolutions.154  This then appears to be one 
case where linkage, or at least the threat of linkage, did in fact 
work to force a chronic violator to comply.  Of course, it may 
well be that Pakistan amended its laws without any intention 
to enforce them, and merely turned their de jure violations into 
de facto violations. 
More difficult than these negative obligation cases are those 
involving a government’s derogations from their positive obliga-
tions to ensure that domestic employers comply with its laws.  
In such cases the ILO must do more than simply request the 
nation to revise its laws; indeed the host country may already 
be in de jure compliance.  While the liable party is still the gov-
ernment, it is less clear what actions it should take in order to 
“ensure that…”155   
  
(IFBWW), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and 
the All Pakistan Federation of Labour (APFOL) ILO Report No. 294, (Vol. 
LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 2) at para. 419(b). 
 151. Id. 
 152. CFA Case No. 2006, Complaint against the Government of Pakistan 
presented by the All Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions (APFTU) and the 
Federation of Oil, Gas, Steel and Electricity Workers (FOGSEW-Pakistan) 
ILO Report No. 318, (Vol. LXXXII, 1999, Series B, No. 3) at para. 352(a). 
 153. ILO Warning to Government, DAGENS ARBETE, Jan. 25, 2000, available 
at http://www.dagensarbete.se/home/da/home.nsf/pages/9C5E7C3AF112D313 
41256874003 ED1A9?OpenDocument.  
 154. CFA Case No. 2006, supra note 152, at Report No. 323, para. 430; 
CEACR: INDIVIDUAL OBSERVATION CONCERNING CONVENTION NO. 87, FREEDOM 
OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE, 1948 PAKISTAN 
(Ratification: 1951) (2002). 
 155. E.g., see CFA Case No. 2006, supra note 152, at Report No. 323, para. 
43(e) (“The Committee requests the Government to take the appropriate 
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For instance, a 2001 complaint against the government of 
Nicaragua alleged that employers in the Chentex EPZ had dis-
missed employees who were attempting to form a union.156  Fur-
ther, when remaining employees engaged in a protest against 
these dismissals, they too were fired.157  Here the problem was 
not the relevant legislation, which appears to have been in 
compliance with the ILO standards.158  Instead, there was a sys-
tematic derogation of the government’s positive obligation to 
protect against violations.  In this case the ILO’s recommenda-
tion read in part:  
(b) The Committee requests the Government to ensure that 
trade union rights can be freely exercised at CHENTEX Gar-
ments S.A. without the workers being subject to reprisals for 
their legitimate trade union activities. 
(c) The Committee is bound to emphasize the importance of 
the principle that both employers and trade unions bargain in 
good faith and make every effort to reach an agreement.  In 
accordance with this principle, the Committee reminds the 
Government that appropriate measures should be taken to en-
courage and promote the full development and utilization of 
machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or 
employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations, with a 
view to the regulation of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment by means of collective agreements.159  
The language used by the Committee here points up in vivid 
detail the problems facing the ILO in enforcing compliance with 
positive obligations.  First, were the government to comply with 
the request in paragraph (b), what actions would it have to 
take?  It would seem to require government supervision of the 
employment practices in the EPZ, probably involving a police 
presence, certainly guarantees of due process for employees 
  
measures to ensure that the rights of the [Union]… are restored to them with-
out delay.”). 
 156. CFA Case Nos. 2092, 2101, Complaints against the Government of 
Nicaragua presented by the “José Benito Escobar” Trade Union Confederation 
of Workers (CST) and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Work-
ers’ Federation (ITGLWF) ILO Report No. 324, (Vol. LXXXIV, 2001, Series B, 
No. 1). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at para. 733(c). 
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when such freedom is denied, and other legal reforms.  These 
actions are clearly outside the scope of what is considered “labor 
law,” and move into the realm of human rights law.   
Indeed, several of the union-organizing employees that were 
terminated in the Chentex EPZ have subsequently filed suit in 
the United States against their former employer for violating 
“universally recognized labor rights.”160  In their complaint, the 
employees allege that Chentex and — through their negligence 
— the government of Nicaragua, have violated customary in-
ternational human rights law.161  It is important to note that 
they have alleged human rights violations, not labor violations 
per se.  They argue that certain labor rights have in fact gained 
such universal acceptance as to be considered human rights at 
customary international law.162  It is yet to be seen if they will 
prevail in their argument, but essential here is that, in an at-
tempt to enforce what the ILO has been unable to, the employ-
ees have been forced to enlist other areas of international law, 
particularly human rights law.   
Regarding paragraph (c), what would it look like to ensure 
that EPZ operators or employers “bargain in good faith?”  The 
lack or laxity of labor regulation in the EPZ was most likely one 
reason the employer was initially attracted to setting up opera-
tions there.  In addition, the economic trade interests aligned 
against the workers are staggering.  For instance, it has subse-
quently been disclosed that the United States Military had been 
placing large orders for clothing manufactured at the Chentex 
EPZ even as United States diplomats denounced the viola-
tions.163  Further, the operator of the Chentex EPZ is a Taiwan-
ese company and the Taiwanese government has provided mas-
sive economic assistance to the Nicaraguan government since 
  
 160. Docket Report, Tercero v. C & Y Sportswear, Inc., CV00-12715-MN 
(CTx) (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 5, 2000).  
 161. At customary international law, the actions of non-state actors are 
imputable to the government as well.  See, e.g., Valasquez Rodriguez Case, 4 
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, (1988) (judgment), at para. 166.  The govern-
ment thus has what we have called a positive obligation to prevent and re-
dress human rights violations that take place within its jurisdiction. 
 162. Tercero, supra note 160. 
 163. See, e.g., Don Turner, Willard A. Workman & Ira Arlook, International 
Trade and Labor: Leveling Up or Down, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 227, 250 
(2002). 
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the EPZ was set up.164  With these powers aligned against the 
workers, it is hard to imagine there being any bargaining in 
good faith without additional pressure from the workers’ side, 
calculated to neutralize the imbalance.  It is clear the ILO is 
without the means to apply such pressure.  This case then 
serves as a perfect illustration of the intricate web that domes-
tic human rights, labor rights and economic structures form.  It 
is simply outside the competency of the ILO to ensure that re-
forms in economic and human rights policy are made, though 
they are necessary to guarantee compliance with its standards. 
B. The Linkage Debate: What is “Trade-Related?” 
At a recent symposium several scholars gathered to discuss 
whether creating linkage regimes was a legitimate use of the 
WTO.165  While there were disagreements on many issues, one 
recurrent question was what types of issues are proper for the 
WTO to consider, that is, what issues are “trade-related.”166  
Some argued for a strict definition, basically limiting its scope 
to those matters it already handles.167  Others saw room for a 
more open definition but did not think the WTO’s resources 
were capable of handling more than the issues arising under 
the current narrow definition.168  Still others argued that link-
age, though perhaps not in any formalized system as proposed 
for the WTO, already exists, and it is for the international 
community to find adequate institutional responses to accom-
modate it.169  This later argument proceeded from the observa-
tion that there are at present international institutions dedi-
cated to specific issues at international law, and linkage ques-
tions arise only where an issue falls between the explicit juris-
dictions of these institutions.170   
  
 164. Id. 
 165. Symposium, supra note 3. 
 166. Joel P. Trachtman, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, Institu-
tional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and…”, 96  AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 89 (2002). 
 167. Debra P. Steger, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, Afterword, 
The “Trade and.…” Conundrum – A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 140 
(2002). 
 168. Jagdish Bhagwati, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, Afterword, 
The Question of Linkage,  96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 130 (2002).    
 169. Trachtman, supra note 166, at 92. 
 170. Id. at 80. 
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This is an accurate description of the situation in which we 
have found international labor rights.  On the one hand, when 
violations are due to the broader economic policies of the offend-
ing government and its financial relationships with employers, 
as in the Chentex EPZ, compliance with labor standards would 
require reforms that simply exceed labor issues.  Companies 
and host countries have an economic interest in keeping labor 
prices down, and exert considerable (and usually unchecked) 
pressure to ensure that they are.  On the other hand, when vio-
lations are due to, or at lease exacerbated by, the inadequacy of 
the legal and social structures in the offending state, compli-
ance would require governmental reform that also exceeds sim-
ple labor issues and involves human rights protections that are 
properly the subject of international human rights law.  In the 
latter case, compliance is no less of a problem.171  However, only 
in the former case are there carrots and sticks available to en-
courage the reforms necessary for labor compliance.  It is not 
simply because these remedial mechanisms are available that 
trade becomes a necessary partner in enforcing compliance; it is 
also because, as we saw in the Chentex EPZ case, trade and 
economic pressure, if not harnessed and used as forces to en-
sure labor compliance, risk becoming forces against compliance. 
Further, the question of what is trade-related only appears 
from the WTO side of the debate: Is the WTO a proper venue for 
linkages?  Indeed, there are a variety of other linkage systems 
available, including IMF, World Bank, and bilateral condi-
tions.172  The question from the labor rights perspective is not 
whether the WTO or any of these other particular institutions 
is competent, or has proper jurisdiction over labor rights; it is 
whether the ILO alone has the institutional jurisdiction and 
competency over all the conditions necessary to ensure the ef-
fective protection of its own labor standards.   
CONCLUSION 
Labor rights, when enforceable and meaningful, exist in a 
web of other rights, interests and protections.  The ILO cannot 
ensure that these other rights or interests are balanced against 
labor rights, but will surely fail in its own purpose when they 
  
 171. See, e.g., Collingsworth, supra note 13. 
 172. See Leebron, supra note 4. 
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are not.  A lesson comes from our initial observation that labor 
rights sit uncomfortably between human and economic rights 
and interests: true economic progress and development requires 
the betterment of non-economic conditions.  International regu-
latory institutions must learn this lesson if the benefits of glob-
alization are to be distributed amongst all affected.  This means 
that international institutions, though specialized in particular 
areas, must cooperate with one another to address the equally 
important areas where their particular concerns conflict.  In-
stead, the tendency has been for institutions to narrowly define 
their areas of concern, and the resulting gaps have been exactly 
where violations are rampant. 
The balancing approach used in the United States carves 
back the rights of others which would otherwise interfere with 
the exercise of labor rights.  At international law, the ILO is 
competent, in fact, was formed to decide when a labor right is 
being infringed by another; but in practice, it is not competent 
to, and does not have the power to, carve back that other, 
infringing right.  These infringing rights are most often 
economic ones, such as property rights and trade interests.  It 
follows that for international labor rights to be protected, the 
ILO must be able to work with the institutions who regulate 
these infringing rights. Therefore, the question is not whether 
there should be linkage between labor (or other human) rights 
and economic privilege, but whether the international 
regulatory community at large, including the ILO, will 
recognize the interconnection that already exists in practice, 
and accordingly create suitable mechanisms to regulate that 
interconnection.   
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The era of globalization is still young, and there is reason to 
be hopeful that through better cooperation, the ILO will find 
the partnerships it needs to secure labor rights, and further 
economic and social conditions globally. 
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